University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Business - Papers

Faculty of Business

2018

Caught Between Two Worlds: Clusters, microfinance officers and
accountability mechanisms in a Sri Lankan MFI
Nadeera Ranabahu
University of Canterbury, nurm263@uowmail.edu.au

Lee C. Moerman
University of Wollongong, leem@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Ranabahu, Nadeera and Moerman, Lee C., "Caught Between Two Worlds: Clusters, microfinance officers
and accountability mechanisms in a Sri Lankan MFI" (2018). Faculty of Business - Papers. 1524.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/1524

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Caught Between Two Worlds: Clusters, microfinance officers and accountability
mechanisms in a Sri Lankan MFI
Abstract
This paper studies the accountability mechanisms and dynamics that exist within a microfinance context
when microfinance officers (MFOs) interact with borrowers at the community level (MFO-community
interface). In the Sri Lankan microfinance institution (MFI) used in this study, community units or clusters
comprising of several peer or solidarity groups engage with MFOs in the field. Using Ritchie and
Richardson's (2000) accountability typologies (codified, contingent, assumed and collateral), this article
explores how multiple and complex accountability relationships manifest at the MFO community
interface.The data collected from interviews, discussions, observations, document reviews and the
primary researcher's reflective notes demonstrate that both codified and contingent accountability
associations are evident for MFOs. Peer groups, however, demonstrate both collateral and contingent
accountability associations, while clusters show assumed accountability associations. These different
types of accountability have implications for the empowerment potential of MFIs.

Keywords
accountability, mechanisms, sri, lankan, officers, mfi, two, worlds:, clusters, microfinance, caught, between

Disciplines
Business

Publication Details
Ranabahu, N. & Moerman, L. (2018). Caught Between Two Worlds: Clusters, microfinance officers and
accountability mechanisms in a Sri Lankan MFI. Third Sector Review, 24 (2), 1-34.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/1524

Caught Between Two Worlds:
Clusters, microfinance officers
and accountability mechanisms
in a Sri Lankan MFI
Nadeera Ranabahu, Department of Management,
Marketing and Entrepreneurship, University of Canterbury,*
and Lee Moerman, School of Accounting, Economics &
Finance, University of Wollongong

Abstract
This paper studies the accountability mechanisms and dynamics that exist
within a microfinance context when microfinance officers (MFOs) interact
with borrowers at the community level (MFO–community interface). In the Sri
Lankan microfinance institution (MFI) used in this study, community units or
clusters comprising of several peer or solidarity groups engage with MFOs in the
field. Using Ritchie and Richardson’s (2000) accountability typologies (codified,
contingent, assumed and collateral), this article explores how multiple and
complex accountability relationships manifest at the MFO–community interface.
The data collected from interviews, discussions, observations, document reviews
and the primary researcher’s ref lective notes demonstrate that both codified
and contingent accountability associations are evident for MFOs. Peer groups,
however, demonstrate both collateral and contingent accountability associations,
while clusters show assumed accountability associations. These different types
of accountability have implications for the empowerment potential of MFIs.
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Introduction
In the microfinance context, a large number of organisations provide
lending to the poor with the express aim of poverty alleviation through
empowerment and active participation (Marini et al. 2017). Microfinance
institutions (MFIs), in particular, provide small-scale financial services
to those who have limited or no access to traditional banking services
(Karlan & Goldberg 2011: 20). However, the pioneering Grameen Bank
member-based model of serving the poor in Bangladesh has changed over
time, with the emergence of more commercially oriented MFIs. These
MFIs, which focus on financial performance and deliver microfinance
loans at market-based interest rates (Christen 2001), have increasingly
been criticised for profiting at the expense of the poor. For example,
in the case of Banco Compartamos in Mexico and SKS Microfinance
in India, the owners became instant millionaires by releasing shares at
an extremely high price in their initial public offering (Rosenberg et al.
2009; Chen et al. 2010; CGAP 2010). These two incidents and similar
financial-focused practices accumulated into a potential ‘tipping point’
for microfinance stakeholders, and led to a debate about whether MFIs
use the poor to enhance profitability, especially through high interest
rates. This brings into question whether commercially oriented MFIs
should be a part of priority sector subsidies, and whether donors should
always assist commercially oriented MFIs during their establishment
phase (Rosenberg 2007; Chen et al. 2010). The perceived lack of clientcentred practices raises concerns about MFI accountability relationships
and the responsibility to deliver the objective of empowerment (and
subsequent poverty alleviation).
The concept of accountability reflects both being ‘held responsible’
and ‘taking responsibility’ for actions (Cornwall 2000). It is defined as:
. . . the means through which individuals and organizations are held
externally to account for their actions and as the means by which
they take internal responsibility for continuously shaping and scrutinizing organizational mission, goals, and performance (Ebrahim
2003b: 194).

2
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Within the MFI context, institutions are responsible for and to multiple
stakeholders, therefore different types of accountability relationships
have emerged and are well defined in the literature. In terms of
vertical relationships, downward accountability refers to an institution’s
responsibility towards its beneficiaries (Ebrahim 2003b). Downward
accountability is often framed within a power dynamic with an emphasis
on beneficiary empowerment (Kilby 2006), while upward accountability
refers to the responsibility to donors and funding agencies. It is often
referred to as hierarchical, since accountability is often directed upward
to a defined group of powerful stakeholders (Taylor et al. 2014). To
counter unidirectional responsibility, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008)
refer to a more holistic style that combines the interests of various
stakeholders in both upward and downward relationships, allowing for
alternative forms of accountability. This may also include a range of
methods or models, such as oral or visual forms of giving an account.
At a horizontal or relational level, internal accountability refers to
the commitment of an organisation to its institutional values (Ebrahim
2003a, 2003b). Sometimes referred to as identity accountability, it
focuses on the integrity or values and mission of the organisation to its
beneficiaries, since it allows organisational management, rather than the
donors, to scope the boundaries of responsibility (O’Dwyer & Unerman
2008; Taylor et al. 2014). In practice, however, these accountability
relationships manifest in complex ways. For example, reporting to donors
and funders is often given priority over the needs of borrowers (Dixon
et al. 2006; Walsh 2016), especially in circumstances where foreign
sourced-funding exists (Mir & Bala 2015). Accountability, therefore, is
always relational and contextual, and more often operationalised and
practised in the field (Marini et al. 2017).
Given the controversial nature of commercially oriented MFIs,
this article focuses on accountability relationships at the level where
the MFI representatives interact with borrowers. With regard to how
accountability manifests at the borrower interface, it explores how
microfinance officers (MFO) interact with community groups (clusters),
and how members of these groups engage with each other (peer or
solidarity groups). Since this study involves a Sri Lankan commercial
T H I R D S E CTO R R E V I E W
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MFI, the following section introduces the Sri Lankan microfinance
sector, before a description of the MFI and its lending model. This is
followed by a discussion of the relevant literature on empowerment
and accountability, and the introduction of the analytical framework
of accountability used in the study. It found that multiple dimensions
of accountability exist at the MFO–community level of engagement,
and the article concludes with a discussion of these findings and their
implications for empowerment.

Background: Sri Lanka and the Hope
Microfinance Institute (HMI)1
Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income country with 20.7 million people,
of whom 77% live in rural areas (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2015; World
Bank 2015). Although the finance sector is dominated by banks following
the Sri Lankan financial sector’s deregulation in 1977 (Charitonenko &
De Silva 2002), the country has a versatile microfinance sector. A number
of institutions provide microfinance services; these include cooperatives,
such as the Cooperative Rural Banks; Thrift and Credit Cooperative
Societies (TCCSs) (later revitalised as SANASA – the Sinhalese acronym
for TCCSs); non-government organisations (NGOs); state-sponsored
institutions; banks; and finance companies (World Bank 2006; Atapattu
2009; GTZ ProMiS 2010).
This case study involves an NGO-MFI limited by guarantee, HMI.2
According to the institution’s 2014 annual report, HMI envisions creating
an equitable and empowered society and alleviating poverty. HMI has
eighteen branches in four provinces (out of Sri Lanka’s nine), and serves
more than 70,000 borrowers with an outstanding loan portfolio of SLR
1.64 billion (Sri Lankan rupees). The portfolio-at-risk is estimated at
1.33% for one day and 0.8% for 30 days.3 For the period of the study
(2014), HMI employed 215 staff.
HMI’s head office and branches have different functions. According
to operational guidelines, a typical HMI branch has four or five MFOs,
an enterprise development officer (EDO), two officers for administrative
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and accounting functions, and a branch manager. MFOs’ roles and
responsibilities include forming community-based borrower groups,
conducting loan assessments, disbursing microfinance loans and
collecting loan instalments. Thus, MFOs are in direct contact with
community borrowers. Similarly, EDOs arrange and sometimes deliver
enterprise-related services. The administrative and accounting functions
are handled by two office-based staff at branch level. Branch managers
oversee all field and branch level activities and report to one of four area
managers, who in turn report to an operations manager at HMI’s head
office, in Colombo. The head office also undertakes human resource,
financial and information management functions.
HMI uses cluster-based lending to deliver credit services. This lending
model is grounded in solidarity principles, where a group rather than an
individual is responsible for loan repayment. This model closely resembles
the lending mechanism used in the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Figure
1 provides an illustration of HMI’s credit delivery model.
Figure 1

HMI’s credit delivery model

*B: Borrower
**MFO: Microfinance officer
Source: Based on HMI’s 2014 annual report and operational manual.
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A cluster is an unregistered, community-based unit that acts as an
intermediary for loan collection. A cluster has around eight to ten peer
groups, i.e. three members who guarantee each other’s loans. MFOs
visit these clusters once a month and collect individual loan instalments.
One MFO has around 30 to 33 clusters. Thus, a branch usually has 120
to 165 clusters. HMI’s 2014 annual report highlights that, on average,
there is a caseload of 750 borrowers per MFO.
Within this context, MFOs have the role of operationalising HMI’s
development objectives, particularly empowerment, through their
engagement with microfinance borrowers participating in cluster
meetings. Hence, within an NGO-MFI setting, such as HMI, MFOs have
to conduct activities beyond loan-related tasks to ensure empowerment
and participation. The next section defines and examines the concepts
of empowerment and participation in NGOs and NGO-type MFIs.

Empowerment and participation
In the development literature, empowerment and active participation are
foundational concepts in sustainable poverty alleviation. Empowerment,
within a microfinance context, is defined in terms of the engagement of
the poor in income-generating activities (i.e. economic empowerment)
(Saidu et al. 2014), increased access to power and resources at both
community and household levels (i.e. social empowerment) (Torri
& Martinez 2014), and involvement in political/legal activities (i.e.
political empowerment) (Nawaz 2014). To achieve these goals, MFIs
emphasise participatory decision-making and regular interactions with
microfinance groups (Saidu et al. 2014; Bawole & Langnel 2016; Orso
& Fabrizi 2016).
However, not all of these community/beneficiary participation
initiatives have resulted in positive outcomes. For example, Bawole
and Langnel (2016) found that community members who were not
involved in the pre-planning of projects were not empowered, because
the organisations had conceptualised specific projects with funders
before visiting the beneficiary community. In addition, organisations
often set the rules of participation and limited the role of the community
6
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to endorsement of pre-prepared plans and prior decisions, and other
mundane aspects of projects. Thus, beneficiaries became passive rather
than active participants (Bawole & Langnel 2016). Further reasons for
the lack of community engagement include: the perception that shifting
accountability to beneficiaries may weaken institutional control (Kilby
2006); operational obstacles such as staff availability, leadership issues
and the quality of staff and partners (Walsh 2016); local elites managing/
working in communities that under-represent the beneficiary group
(O’Dwyer & Unerman 2010); and a hierarchical social order (i.e. caste
or class) that limits the participation of certain community groups
(Krösschell 2013).
In this study, we operationalise empowerment as entrepreneurship –
that is, the ability of borrowers (mainly women) to start or develop a
business by taking decisions, undertaking actions and navigating complex
economic, social and MFI norms and practices. Microfinance services
improve entrepreneurship outcomes, such as self-employment leading to
business income, profit and investment in assets; social ties and networks;
and participation in decision-making and bargaining power (Khandker et
al. 1998; Attanasio et al. 2015; Augsburg et al. 2015; Banerjee et al. 2015;
Crépon et al. 2015; Ranabahu 2017). These outcomes, specifically the
ability to contribute to family welfare and raise self-esteem, enhance the
potential for empowerment (Osmani 2007). Therefore, while economic
empowerment is often foregrounded, aspects of social and political
empowerment are also evident in entrepreneurial practices. However, as
Kilby (2004) argues, to achieve these objectives, organisations should have
some level of accountability to the beneficiaries they aim to empower.
For example, formal and structured accountability mechanisms and
processes are found to have stronger links with empowerment outcomes
(Kilby 2006). In cases where empowerment is not an explicit goal, and
therefore not embedded in formal processes, the institution is less likely
achieve this in practice (Kilby 2004). In a previous study examining
entrepreneurial decision-making in HMI (Ranabahu 2017), having a
microfinance loan contributed to the skill-set needed for borrowers to
develop into expert entrepreneurs. While this link to empowerment was
evident, what was not clear was the role of cluster-level engagement and
T H I R D S E CTO R R E V I E W

7

accountability practices with MFOs. To examine this further and extend
our understanding of empowerment, we focus on both vertical and
horizontal accountability dimensions at the MFO–community interface.
First, however, we discuss concepts of accountability, with particular
attention given to the context of developing countries and MFIs.

Accountability
Accountability is concerned with ‘the giving and demanding of reasons for
conduct’ (Roberts & Scapens 1985: 447). In a Western, capitalist context,
accountability is linked to notions of responsible governance, stewardship
and decision-useful information for economic decision-making. While
both are enshrined in regulatory frameworks such as international
accounting standards, they have been criticised as offering a partial
economic perspective of accountability relationships (see Chwastiak
1999). Therefore, accounting scholars have considered alternative
perspectives to explore accountability, which reinforces the idea that
the concept is complex, contextual, political and multidimensional.
For example, critical theorists explore the hegemonic potential or
exploitation in financial accounting that privileges shareholder needs.
In addition, accounting scholars often adopt a broad definition of ‘an
account’. Examples include ancient stone tablets (Vollmers 2009) or
counter accounts produced by social activist groups (Moerman & van
der Laan 2015). The acknowledgement that accountability is a contextual
and multidimensional practice means that researchers must consider the
field in which the study is conducted and the type of relationship that
is mediated, and take a broader view to include a range of ‘accounts’.
This is more than evident in the microfinance context, where formal
and informal, verbal and non-verbal accounts are evidenced.

Accountability and microfinance
To date, the microfinance accountability literature has given prominence
mainly to horizontal and vertical institutional-level accountability
relationships. For example, Hartarska (2009) studied how control was
8
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exercised by external stakeholders and how those practices impacted
internal governance and accountability mechanisms. Ahmed and Khan
(2016) examined formal governance mechanisms and financial reporting
and disclosure within the Bangladeshi context and found that frequency
of board of directors’ meetings and directors’ qualifications contribute
to high levels of financial disclosure. Similarly, the client protection
card introduced by a South African MFI to borrowers was reflective
of a downward accountability mechanism (Marini et al. 2017). Akanga
(2017) studied institutionalised accountability practices in Cameroon
and their impact on poverty alleviation. The author found that
professional practices and bureaucratic structures introduced to manage
accountability had resulted in MFIs counteracting these pressures by
manipulating accounting systems, focusing operations into urban areas,
and focusing only on short-term outcomes. Tanima and Brown (2016)
found that oppressive social and organisational realities, such as class
structure or authority or power of religious institutions, could slowly
be transformed to create female empowerment through the creation of
dynamic, collaborative and dialogic spaces in the Bangladeshi context.
Researchers have also focused on MFOs and their role in managing
complex accountability mechanisms. Within the microfinance
environment, Dixon et al. (2006) found that, on the one hand, loan
officers represent institutional interests for timely loan payments, while
also balancing both vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (relational)
accountabilities. Hence, these loan officers perform multiple, ambiguous
and changeable roles, and often act as ‘debt collectors’ to protect their
own interests at the expense of being the participative community
‘facilitators’ required by the MFI (Siwale & Ritchie 2011). As these
studies demonstrate, MFOs are often managing or balancing competing
accountabilities (Dixon et al. 2007; Siwale & Ritchie 2011). Therefore,
within a microfinance context, research at the MFO–community
interface is limited. We fill this research gap by focusing on clusters and
peer groups at the community level of borrowers of HMI, since they
shape accountability dynamics that occur internally within institutional
boundaries. For example, borrowers use their personal connections, or
form peer or solidarity groups, within a cluster; screen people; distinguish
T H I R D S E CTO R R E V I E W
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‘good’ borrowers from ‘bad’ ones; ensure loan utilisation; and enforce
repayment (Ghatak & Guinnane 1999). MFOs share information; collect
loan repayments from borrowers during cluster meetings; and liaise
with higher-level administration. Therefore, to examine the different
types of accountability mechanisms within the MFI context, we need
to adopt a typology that incorporates intra-organisational vertical and
horizontal accountabilities.

Accountability framework
The principal-agent view is premised on the notion that individuals
(principals) have their agendas carried out by other individuals (agents)
(Ebrahim 2003b). In a corporate setting this is seen where management,
as agents, act on behalf of the owners as shareholders. Therefore, the
agency relationship can be at an individual or collective level. MFIs are
accountable to multiple principals, such as funders, investors, regulators
and beneficiaries (Ebrahim 2003b). In its relationship with external
agencies (Dixon et al. 2006), the MFI is the agent. The MFI acts as
principal as well as agent when addressing staff concerns and working
with clients (Dixon et al. 2006). However, these vertical accountability
relationships do not capture the unique relational dimension associated
with microfinance lending. Nor do they take into account the more
ethical stakeholder-scope accountability suggested by O’Dwyer and
Unerman (2008). For example, microfinance loans are typically granted
through peer or solidarity groups where a group, in addition to the
individual, guarantee loans (Ledgerwood & Earne 2013). The presence
and the use of diverse practices such as disclosure statements and reports,
performance assessments and evaluations, participation, self-regulation
and social auditing are used to enforce accountability to a range of
stakeholders (Ebrahim 2003a, 2003b).
In the MFI context, the MFO is an agent for the MFI in a vertical
relationship and a facilitator or principal in the horizontal relationship
with borrowers. To overcome the difficulties of identifying a typical
agency relationship and incorporating these important relational aspects,
we use Ritchie and Richardson’s (2000) accountability framework,
10
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developed for small business. Dixon et al. (2006) provided empirical
evidence in their study in Zambia of the relationship between MFOs
and joint liability credit groups and their ability to facilitate or manage
competing priorities. In this paper, we also use Ritchie and Richardson’s
(2000) typology to incorporate both vertical and horizontal accountability
in a different lending paradigm, where MFOs formally engage borrowers
at a community (cluster) level rather than at peer or solidarity level.
Ritchie and Richardson (2000) describe four forms of accountability –
mandatory, contingent, compliant and collateral – to distinguish between
vertical/hierarchical rule-based accountability and horizontal relationalbased accountabilities (see Figure 2).
Figure 2

Four types of accountability

Source: Ritchie & Richardson (2000: 454).

Type 1 – mandatory or codified accountability – is the most formal rulebased and least discretionary form (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). These
are clear, recognised rules that are adhered to impersonally against the
set agenda of an organisation (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). However,
if the process becomes over-formalised, compliance may not have any
real effect, and results in ‘creative compliance’ (Ritchie & Richardson
2000), or ‘construction of structures that comply with rules in form but
T H I R D S E CTO R R E V I E W
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use it in unintended or unanticipated ways’ (McBarnet 2006: 1095). In a
Zambian MFI, Dixon et al. (2006) found a strong Type 1 accountability
to donors and external funders, since an institution is dependent on
funding to support its resource position. In addition, ratings, audit and
financial statement disclosure practices ensure strong accountability
to external stakeholders, and in turn influence internal MFI practices
(Hartarska 2009).
Next, Type 2 – contingent or bounded accountability – strongly
combines both vertical and horizontal accountability associations,
meaning rules are combined with more accepted customary practices
(Ritchie & Richardson 2000). For example, in an organisational setting,
executive management may set performance targets for benchmarking
strategy goals but allow middle-level management discretion over how
these are measured or achieved. Within MFIs, internal management
uses rules and regulations, combined with relational aspects (Type 2),
to ensure that branch and field level officers are accountable to the
organisation (Dixon et al. 2007).
Type 3 – compliant or assumed accountability – weakly combines
both vertical and horizontal accountability associations. Thus, Type 3
accountability practices lack both formal rules and relational commitment
(Ritchie & Richardson 2000). This is the potentially hidden side of Type
1 accountability and acts as a cover and/or supplement for Type 1
accountability practices. For example, this may occur when rules and
procedures are weak on specific actions and the manager implements
his or her own customary practices.
Finally, Type 4 – collateral or reciprocal accountability – relies upon
the strength of mutual ties and relations (Ritchie & Richardson 2000).
This is prominent within the microfinance sector, as clusters and/or
peer groups are formed according to personal relationships and practices
that exist beyond the rules and regulations (Dixon et al. 2006). For
example, borrowers at peer-group level may rely on a mutual bond
to repay each other’s loans, in order to prevent default at the cluster
level. Social or cultural norms are often absent in formal rules that
drive Type 1 and Type 2 accountabilities. However, in relational forms
12
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of accountability, social or reputational loss has been demonstrated to
drive strong commitment and accountability (Ranabahu 2017).
This study examines how these four types of accountabilities manifest
at the MFO–community interface using the data collected from HMI.
The next section explains the data collection and analysis method.

Method
This study is interpretive and uses a case study approach to reflect the
contextual and relational nature of accountability. The subjective and
reflective experiences of both the primary researcher and MFI officers
and borrowers ‘in the field’ were used. The study was carried out using
a rapid ethnographic approach: ‘a form of multi-method ethnography
involving data collection from numerous sources over a relatively short
period of time’ (Baines & Cunningham 2013: 74). Pink and Morgan
(2013) point out that rapid ethnography is an alternative to conventional
ethnography when studying research issues within a natural context.
We selected this approach as it allowed us to gather ethnographic data
within a natural context for a limited period in the field.
A rapid ethnography approach involves the primary researcher
becoming familiar with the research context, and collecting data
using multiple methods to compensate for the short time spent in
the field. Since the primary researcher was a former employee of
HMI, and skilled in the local language Sinhalese, she used modern
communication methods (Skype, email and so on) to build rapport
with HMI staff, before going to the selected branches. In addition,
multiple data-collection tools (see Table 1) were used over a two-month
period (December 2014 to January 2015) to explore empowerment –
operationalised as entrepreneurship – as an outcome of microfinance
services. The focus was on how entrepreneurs make decisions and
acquire expertise using the products and services of HMI in particular,
and a microfinance context more broadly. The data collected included
institutional documents, observations, discussions with peer groups and
clusters, individual interviews, and the primary researcher’s informal
discussions and reflections. Use of these multiple techniques during
T H I R D S E CTO R R E V I E W
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the data-collection period also reflects the ‘time deepening’ strategy
of rapid ethnography.
The primary researcher visited HMI head office, four branches (one
from each province in which HMI operates), clusters, peer groups and
individuals to collect data. All the interviews and discussions were
conducted in local languages (an interpreter was used for one interview
with a Tamil-speaking person). All the interviews and discussions were
later translated and transcribed into English.
Table 1 outlines the data-collection methods used at each level.
Table 1

Data-collection methods and details

Level
Organisational
level

Details
Head office • Document review (mainly operational manual
and strategic plans of the MFI).
• Informal observations and researcher’s notes.
Branch

• Researcher’s notes and informal observations.

MFO level

• Informal discussions and researcher’s notes.

Cluster level

• Three observations of cluster procedures. Each
observation was conducted for 30–45 minutes by
the primary researcher.1
• Two focus group discussions (FGDs) with cluster
members were conducted. All focus group
participants were borrowers of loans. Each focus
group discussion lasted around twenty minutes.
• Researcher’s notes.

Peer group level

• Three group discussions with peer group
members who guarantee each other’s loans. The
group discussions lasted around twenty minutes.
• Researcher’s notes.

Borrower level

• Twenty-four interviews with microfinance borrowers
who operate businesses. Each interview was
conducted at the borrower’s business premises/
home and lasted 30 to 45 minutes.

1. In this study, the first author is the primary researcher.

14
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Since the researchers were interested in accountability practices at
the MFO–community interface, we explored activities and policies of
the MFI regarding: cluster formation and function; the role of cluster
members and the cluster leader; peer groups and their function; and
the MFO roles and responsibilities regarding cluster formation and
operations. In addition, we explored the tasks carried out by MFOs at
the cluster level, and compared them with the operational guidelines
produced by HMI to contrast the level of engagement by MFOs with
formal rules and procedures and the informal or customary practices
used at the MFO–community interface. These findings are presented
and discussed in the following section.

Accountability in practice
As Marini et al. (2017) argue, accountability is operationalised in practice
and is therefore social and contextual. Our data highlights that MFIs and
MFOs use clusters as avenues to enforce vertical accountability, and rely
on borrowers’ relational ties to ensure horizontal accountability. The
following section presents the findings according to the four typologies
described earlier.

Type 1. Codified accountability: HMI formal rules and
operational procedures
Mandatory or codified accountability is the most formal rules-based
form of accountability (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). At the MFO–
community interface, HMI used clear and specific institutional rules
and guidelines to ensure mandatory accountability from MFOs.
These rules/guidelines covered activities related to cluster formation,
management and evaluation, and the roles and responsibilities of
MFOs. For example, MFOs mobilised individuals, formed clusters
and explained the organisational vision, the lending mechanisms and
loan features.

T H I R D S E CTO R R E V I E W
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It was explained that there should be three-member groups, then loans
could be obtained, and there need to be 30 members per cluster; those
were explained there [at the initial community gathering] (FGD 1).
At that gathering, they [HMI officers] explained that HMI has lowinterest-rate loans, the MFI was started by a foreign person who had
money with the objective of improving the livelihood of poor people, and
so on (Peer group discussion 2).
Beyond these tasks, MFOs were responsible for cluster functions. At
cluster meetings, MFOs conducted a specific set of activities as outlined
in the operational manual (such as religious observance, welcome,
institutional announcements, discussion of a specific topic, and loan
collection) and focused on providing convenient financial services to
borrowers:
The officers themselves come and fill all the loan forms with us. They
come and collect the instalments as well. So, we think this is convenient
(Peer group discussion 3).
Operational aspects related to HMI emergency loans and hospitalisation
benefit schemes were also handled by MFOs at the community interface.
Although the MFOs’ role included both borrower mobilisation/
facilitation and debt collection, priority was given to debt collection.
This was visible during field observations, where some MFOs did not
discuss a specific topic, as required by the operational manual:
Then, the MFO welcomed everyone and started the meeting. During
that time, the MFO introduced me and mentioned that I am doing the
study. Then the MFO started collecting the money . . . Towards the end
of the meeting, the MFO mentioned that ‘regularly checking the eye
sight is important’ and said that this is the daily topic. Only one sentence
was said about the topic (Field notes, 3 December 2015).
Specifically in remote locations, MFOs considered time and their own
priorities, and focused on debt collection. For example, as observed by
16
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the main researcher, in one of the hilly areas the MFO only conducted
debt-collection activities. When an inquiry was made as to why, the
MFO mentioned that due to travelling difficulties and the time required
to come to the remote location, there was not enough time for him to
carry out all the cluster functions, as specified in the HMI operational
manual. Since performance evaluation and bonuses related to credit
services (such as disbursements and on-time debt collection), the MFOs
focused on the completion of debt-related tasks.
To ensure mandatory (Type 1) accountability, HMI’s internal auditors
monitored branch and cluster activities. They conducted regular branch
audits to assess clusters and verify individual repayments against the
branch records, and assessed MFOs’ activities. This was an observation
made by the primary researcher at one of the branches (Field notes, 15
December 2014). Therefore, HMI had rigorous procedures in place to
safeguard its interests, and to evaluate whether MFOs carried out some
of these tasks at the cluster level.

Type 2. Contingent accountability: HMI formal rules
and procedures and socially sanctioned customary
practices
Type 2, contingent or bounded accountability, combines both vertical and
horizontal accountability associations strongly (Ritchie & Richardson
2000). At the community interface, both MFOs and peer groups used
contingent accountability practices.
MFOs

MFOs used a mix of formal strategies and ‘custom practices’ in debt
collection. This is consistent with Ritchie and Richardson’s (2000)
findings for contingent (Type 2) accountability. For example, MFOs
used formal strategies, outlined in the operational manual, such as
collecting money from borrowers during the cluster meeting. In case of
non-repayment, the HMI operational manual required MFOs to send a
formal letter, remind guarantors and even take legal action. However, in
practice MFOs used their own strategies to ensure borrowers attended
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cluster meetings and subsequently maintained loan repayments. For
example, one MFO was firm about on-time cluster meeting attendance:
Some people are there, who attend the meeting when it is almost finishing. Then, the officer is strict on that. We have been informed to arrive
here, at least 1–2 minutes earlier (FGD 1).
As observed, a few MFOs did not start cluster meetings without the
presence of all the cluster members. If these attendance standards were
not met, there were social and financial implications for borrowers:
In HMI, attendance is compulsory. I could not attend the group meetings
around two times. Then the officer as a punishment approved only
30,000 [SLR] [though the maximum loan amount is 50,000 SLR]
(Interviewee 19, a bra manufacturing business owner).
If the meeting has 30 members, all 30 or their representatives should be
present. If not, the meeting will not start. Even for two hours, you have
to wait until the members come. That is the punishment . . . There were
instances where we had to wait. Few times . . . Once we had to wait
one and a half hours for the meeting to begin. The meeting would not
start until everyone is here (Peer group discussion 1).
Another MFO excluded cluster members and devised social penalties
such as asking latecomers to wait outside the meeting premises (Field
notes, 3 January 2015). When asked why, the branch manager and
MFOs mentioned that customised strategies were required to maintain
repayment discipline:
They [branch manager and the MFO] said that loan recovery takes time
and too little is collected too late. They have to go a few times and it is
not time- or cost-effective. If the officers insist on discipline and show
that they are serious in loan repayments, then loan repayment culture
improves. Then, it is easy in future (Field notes, 6 January 2015).
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Some of the strategies MFOs used were not an HMI requirement and
did not appear in the operational guidelines, and so created incongruities
between MFOs’ actions and MFI policies. Other strategies were
interpreted differently. For example, microfinance borrowers could
arrange for a representative to attend meetings:
When I asked for a loan, the meetings in HMI were also on Wednesdays.
The payment day [for the goods supplied] in Colombo was also
Wednesday. I have to be at Colombo at that time . . . I could not arrange
someone for around two days. Then, for the next round [of loans], I
arranged a representative for the meeting. Now, I send one of the people
working here [in her business] as my representative for the meeting
(Interviewee 19, a bra manufacturing business owner).
As there was no clear direction about the age of a representative in the
operational guidelines, it was observed that children under the age of
sixteen were sometimes representatives for their parents (Field notes,
2 January 2015).
These customised strategies need to be assessed within the context they
operate. The findings highlight that a number of MFIs, in addition to
HMI, operate in the same areas, and borrowers sometimes have multiple
outstanding loans:
I have obtained a loan from Kanrich, then HMI and SEED Lanka [all
MFIs]. I have a 100,000 rupees loan from Kanrich [MFI]. For that, I
have to repay 2000 rupees as instalment for a week. I am in the second
loan cycle (Interviewee 1, a vehicle upholstery business owner).
In these areas, multiple loan borrowers compared services, and this
influenced the actions and activities of the MFOs, since borrowers were
in a ‘take it or leave it’ position (Ebrahim 2003b):
The officer was saying to me [the primary researcher] that in the next
area, since it is really close to the town, a number of microfinance
institutions operate. That is a difficulty for them. Borrowers always
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say that how other institutions conduct meetings such as attendance is
not compulsory, how they can send money with someone else and repay
the loan, etc. (Field notes, 3 December 2015).
This demonstrates that the type of strategies used to ensure loan
repayments is a further consideration in the HMI context.
Peer groups

Peer groups, theoretically, demonstrate Type 2 (contingent) accountability,
with both strong vertical and horizontal accountabilities. For example,
peer groups are bound formally, through a loan contract, for loan
repayment:
All three members have to pay back. So, their [HMI] rules are like that.
If someone cannot pay back the instalments, the other two have to
contribute and repay the loan. That’s how three members have signed
the agreement. So, no one complains and everyone pays back
(Interviewee 5, a garment seller).
This reflects strong formal, rules-based accountability. However, in
addition to the formal agreement, peer groups comprised of self-selected
borrowers and were formed with the basic principle of solidarity; thus,
they reflect strong horizontal accountability. For these reasons, peer
groups demonstrate Type 2 accountability at the MFO–community
interface (see Type 4, collateral accountability, for more details).

Type 3. Assumed accountability: MFOs’ informal rules
and taken-for-granted social norms
As Ritchie and Richardson (2000) explain, Type 3 (compliant or
assumed) accountability weakly combines both vertical and horizontal
accountability associations. This is evident in the way clusters were
formed and functioned.
Clusters are informal community units without legal registration.
There were no formal rules that legally bind all the cluster members
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for loan repayment. Both cluster members and cluster leaders have
limited and largely symbolic roles. For example, when asked at a focus
group discussion to describe their responsibilities with regard to cluster
meetings, borrowers responded with the following:
Borrower 1: To attend the meeting on time.
Borrower 2: Check the availability and accompany all three group
members to the meeting.
Borrower 3: To repay the loans on time (FGD 2).
Therefore, cluster meetings were perceived as a way of ensuring on-time
debt payment. Even the cluster leader’s responsibilities were confined
to arranging meetings and facilitating the HMI meetings:
My role . . . Hmm . . . To check and verify whether all the members of
the groups are present at the meeting. Sometimes, I have to inform about
the meeting by going to houses. The leader should also arrange the
meeting space, by placing chairs to conduct the meeting here. In addition,
if the leader attends any meetings or any events, those details are shared
with the members. If some documents are handed to distribute, those
are given to other members (FGD 2).
However, in the absence of formal rules, informal practices were ‘norm’alised to become taken-for-granted informal rules. For example, although
there was no HMI requirement for cluster members to be responsible for
payments of members’ loans, they adhered to an informal expectation
of repayment in cases of imminent default. At the cluster formation
stage, and even during the cluster functions, MFOs verbally (informally)
enforced loan repayment as a responsibility of cluster members:
In our cluster, there was once, that all the cluster members had to
contribute money, as that member did not pay. If there is something
like that, sir [the MFO] says that the group members should be accountable to other person. The loan instalments of the other two group
members are also not collected. Then, the three people have to somehow
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find money, from somewhere, and repay the instalments (Interviewee
8, a dressmaking business owner).
Therefore, vertical accountability was weak, and the informal rules
shaping the accountability relationships at clusters allowed MFOs to
create their own norms and expectations for the cluster.
While the use of informal rules could be perceived as evidence
of strong relational accountability, this is not the case with Type 3.
Horizontally, relational ties are weak at the cluster level, since borrowers
have insufficient information to develop trust among members. In some
cases, clusters were externally facilitated by MFOs and members. For
example, when there were not enough borrowers to form a cluster,
MFOs merged nearby clusters:
Here this meeting has attendance from two villages: RB2 and 6 Ela.
Earlier there were two clusters. But, cluster members of both the villages
were not enough, and the two clusters were merged. Now, there are 33
members in the cluster (Peer group discussion 3).
However, the hidden side of Type 1 is evident in the tensions observed
within clusters:
One member said that this [members not attending the meeting regularly]
happened because previous staff member [MFO] merged two clusters;
and the cluster members from the other village were not very reliable.
Then, one person got offended and said not to generalise everyone
(Observation note 1).
Cluster members accepted and complied with the MFO practices because
of the power embedded in taken-for-granted norms and procedures.
In this case, the potential for practices that foster empowerment are
limited, since borrowers and MFOs perceive their relationship and
responsibilities as merely debt-related.
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Type 4. Collateral accountability: Mutual ties in
solidarity groups
Type 4 (collateral or reciprocal) accountability relies upon the strength
of mutual ties and relations (Ritchie & Richardson 2000). In HMI, peer
groups are formed with the basic principle of solidarity, which reflects
being held accountable for their actions. Borrowers trust each other to
repay their loans in case of an emergency:
Initially, the [HMI] program informed us that we should have three
members to obtain loans. That is the guarantee – the trustworthiness.
Then we formed three-member groups with people we like. In my group,
we still have the same members (Peer group discussion 3).
Some borrowers preserved trust and ensured loan repayments by
including neighbours or extended family members in their peer groups.
For example, interviewee 11 (the owner of a mobile toy, sweets and
fruit business) had family members in his group, while interviewee 10
(a pillowcase and cement flowerpot business owner) chose neighbours
for her group.
However, the strength of these relational ties varied. For example,
peer groups with strong ties met to enquire whether loan repayments
could be made (interviewee 10: a pillowcase and cement flowerpot
business owner), and contributed money for loan repayments in cases
of need (interviewee 6: a confectionery business owner). In contrast,
the primary researcher observed one peer group explaining to an MFO
that they had problems in contacting one of their group members
(Field notes, 11 December 2015). Hence, as explained, although Type
2 accountability exists in peer groups, in practice Type 4 relational
accountability is the driving force. In this study, being held to account
for loan repayment included peers monitoring each other, with a strong
social reputation dimension:
If I have any doubt that some members will not repay, this happened with
XXX company once. There was a member [who did not repay], so I
informed the field officer of the time when that person is at the house. So
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the officer went to the home and stayed at the doorstep. Then the officer
met the client to collect the money. That happened some time ago . . . In
such cases, we assist the field staff. If someone does anything like that,
it is not good. We do not allow anything like that to happen. Now we do
not have anything like that (Interviewee 9, a mobile tea seller).
Therefore, peer groups used their social knowledge about each other
in a close-knit community to ensure strong collateral accountability.

Discussion
This paper has examined types of accountability mechanisms and the
way these different relationships manifest at the MFO–community
interface. We have explored the cluster formation and functions, peer
groups and their functions, and MFOs’ roles and responsibilities at the
community interface at the level of practice. Our analysis demonstrates
that multiple and complex accountability relationships manifest at
this level. First, MFOs’ actions and tasks at community reflect Type 1
(codified) and Type 2 (contingent) accountability associations. MFOs’
roles and responsibilities are bound by MFI rules and guidelines,
and practices embedded in these formal rules demonstrate Type 1
accountability. MFOs are required to conduct both facilitation and
debt-collection tasks, including visiting communities, establishing
clusters, facilitating loan delivery, collecting loan instalments, providing
a convenient service for rural people, and implementing the HMI vision.
Aligning with NGO accountability mechanisms (Ebrahim 2003b), and
consistent with monitoring and bonding costs associated with agency
relationships, MFI management use performance-based compensation
and branch monitoring to ensure Type 1 accountability.
Consistent with the findings of Siwale and Ritchie (2011), this study
found that, beyond establishing clusters, MFO responsibilities were
focused on debt collection rather than on fostering empowerment
(and ultimately poverty alleviation). Hence, in organisations where
dual objectives such as loan repayment and entrepreneurship exist,
tensions arise. MFOs struggle to manage accountability to both the
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institution and borrowers (Dixon et al. 2006), and inevitably MFOs may
concentrate on their immediate survival as a priority (Siwale & Ritchie
2011). Thus, hiring and socialisation policies are important to manage
these tensions (Battilana & Dorado 2010). For example, Battilana and
Dorado (2010) show that recruiting MFOs who have prior experience
either of working with the poor or of banking led to tensions between
lending tasks and development objectives in the long term, as these
MFOs prioritised the activities they were comfortable with. In addition,
the same authors found that recruiting relatively inexperienced MFOs
and providing training to foster the organisational goals facilitated their
dual roles and hybrid identity, at least in the short term.
Although MFI rules and guidelines shape MFOs’ roles and
responsibilities, in practice MFOs use a mix of rules and ‘custom
practices’ to ensure loan repayment (Type 2: contingent accountability).
HMI expectations for MFOs differ from the traditional role of field
officers in other MFIs – for example, limited activities related to
community mobilisation and enterprise development, as they are
handled by an EDO. At HMI, MFO performance is measured according
to indicators associated with loan disbursements and on-time repayment.
Thus, MFOs use bespoke strategies, unspecified in the operational
manual, to enforce accountability for borrower actions related to
attendance at cluster meetings and loan repayment. Although we did
not find MFOs rearranging their daily tasks to recover loans from
delinquent clients, as Dixon et al. (2007) did, our findings show that
MFOs’ primary focus was on loan repayments at clusters. While MFO
tasks may have been consistent with the objectives of HMI in practice,
there are signs of incongruities between MFOs’ actions and the MFI’s
mission, particularly in situations where MFOs bypass formal vertical
accountability mechanisms that exist in rule compliance.
Nevertheless, the role of MFOs and accountability issues associated
with their tasks need to be assessed within the context in which MFOs
operate. The study highlights that, in some geographical areas, there are
a number of MFIs in operation and borrowers may have multiple loans.
In these areas, the actions and activities of the MFO were influenced
by local exigencies. Ebrahim (2003b) argues that, in highly competitive
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environments, clients have a stronger voice as they have a number of
service providers to choose from. Hence, consistent with Ebrahim’s
(2003b) argument, borrowers are empowered by the ‘take it or leave it’
position in relation to MFOs. Therefore, to maintain the borrower base
and meet performance targets, MFOs adjust their practices beyond the
standards or procedures set by HMI.
In addition to Type 1 and Type 2 accountability associations,
MFOs act as both agent and principal, depending on the relationship.
For example, MFOs implement institutional programs and provide
services to borrowers; hence, MFOs act as agents for HMI. In addition,
internal auditors assure that the interests of HMI are carried out by
MFOs through monitoring. Furthermore, MFOs assume the role of
the principal when dealing with borrowers, and so have the ‘right’ to
demand an account from borrowers with regard to meeting attendance
and loan repayment. Therefore, whether the MFO acts as the principal
or agent in hierarchical relationships is defined by practices.
Type 3 and Type 4 accountability relationships also manifest at
the MFO–community interface. For example, at the cluster level,
although relational ties are weak, all members adhere to the norm of
repaying a loan in cases of imminent default (Type 3 accountability).
This is mainly because, in the absence of formal rules, verbally enforced
informal practices are ‘norm’-alised and become the taken-for-granted
unquestioned informal rules that shape accountability relationships and
practices. These pseudo-rules are weak, though, as they are not legally
binding. In addition, relational ties with Type 3 (assumed) accountability
demonstrate a similar weakness, since MFOs prescribe the rules of
cluster formation rather than develop socially sanctioned norms through
engagement with cluster members. Within these clusters, borrowers lack
sufficient information to develop strong trust relationships. Therefore,
externally facilitated relational ties (such as merging clusters) cause
social tensions that contribute to weak relational ties.
At the cluster level, members as well as leaders demonstrated limited
responsibilities and opportunities for empowerment. Members were
held to account only for continuous participation at cluster meetings
and the maintenance of loan repayments, while cluster leaders merely
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arranged meetings. The leadership role was often symbolic or tokenistic,
as it did not increase the bargaining power of the cluster, and thus
lacked political empowerment potential. Consistent with the findings
of Bawole and Langnel (2016) and Walsh (2016), passive participation is
a function of MFO time constraints and the imposition of bottom-up
accountability practices.
As discussed, Type 4 (collateral) accountability relationships manifest
at the peer or solidarity group level. Within peer groups, borrowers
rely on trust; groups often consist of neighbours and family members.
Peer group members contribute funds to repay loans that demonstrate
strong relational ties. However, peer group members are also bound
by a loan contract, so formal requirements are also evident. Therefore,
while formal mechanisms exist, in practice strong relational ties within
a peer group are dominant. The social monitoring and reputational
loss as the penalty for non-payment at cluster-level meetings are strong
motivators to draw on relational ties.

Conclusion
This study highlights several theoretical and empirical contributions
to the accountability literature within the microfinance sector. First,
this study is one of the first to explore accountability mechanisms
that manifest at the MFO–community interface (particularly within
clusters and peer groups). The study found that MFOs’ actions reflect
both codified and contingent accountability. That is, while MFOs are
bound by MFI formal rules, in practice they use customised strategies
to ensure debt collection, and a mix of strong vertical and horizontal
accountabilities. In addition, this study demonstrates that clusters
ref lect assumed accountability; that is, norms act as pseudo-rules
when the mutual bond among cluster members is weak. Hence, both
vertical and relational accountabilities are compromised at the cluster
level. Finally, peer groups demonstrate both contingent and collateral
accountability; that is, although group members are bound by a loan
contract, in practice strong mutual ties shape individual actions. This
study also demonstrates that relational accountability acts as a buffer
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through customary or socially accepted practices, or taken-for-granted
assumptions when hierarchical accountabilities are inadequate. Brown
(2009: 314) recognises the need for new forms of accounting ‘that facilitate
more participatory forms of decision-making and accountability’. In this
case, forms of accountability that are empowering may need to include
greater participation by borrowers at the cluster level.
Next, this study provides empirical evidence for accountability in the
Sri Lankan microfinance context. Researchers have primarily focused
on countries such as Bangladesh, Zambia, South Africa and Cameroon
to study accountability mechanisms (see Dixon et al. 2006; Siwale &
Ritchie 2011; Ahmed & Khan 2016; Akanga 2017; Marini et al. 2017).
Our study extends the available evidence base from an under-researched
context, and supports the applicability of Ritchie and Richardson’s (2011)
accountability framework.
Third, this study illustrates that the empowerment potential in
terms of entrepreneurial outcomes at the cluster level is limited.
Although cluster members participated in meetings and repaid
their loans, the tasks and activities associated with a cluster did not
provide the skills or opportunities for borrowers to become expert
entrepreneurs. While microfinance loans foster entrepreneurship,
the practices of planning, developing ideas and managing challenges
about business processes are important in entrepreneurial thinking
(Ranabahu 2017). Therefore, thinking about a loan, cost-benefit analyses
and opportunities for investment are not activities that occur at the
point of debt collection, where borrowers only account for a monthly
loan repayment. At the cluster level, participation occurs because of
strong vertical accountability relationships, where HMI stipulates the
roles and routine tasks of MFOs and members. In peer groups, where
relational accountability is strong, on-time repayment through formal
and informal accountability mechanisms is ensured, and the work of
economic empowerment occurs. MFIs must ensure that empowerment is
embedded in alternative ways besides peer groups. For example, training
and capacity-building programs for MFI borrowers conducted by HMI
enterprise development services or EDOs at the branch level enhance
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economic empowerment potential, and participation in decision-making
ensures social empowerment.
Fourth, this study demonstrates that accountability is defined by
practices in the field. MFOs act as both the principal and agent, and
adopt roles interchangeably depending on the task and associated
accountability relationship. Thus, accountability is both contextual
and practice-based. In addition, MFOs normalise informal practises
in the long run that may create incongruities between MFOs’ actions
and MFIs’ policies and overall social objectives. Similarly, MFOs adjust
their actions when borrowers are in a stronger bargaining position
and are politically empowered. Therefore, training programs and
socialisation practices should examine why and how officers implement
operational guidelines, and also consider the empowerment potential
in relational forms of accountability consistent with the objectives of
the MFI to mitigate the tensions of being caught between two worlds
at the MFO–community interface.
Finally, future research in this area could focus on whether these
accountability relationships exist in other types of microfinance
lending models. One example, in India, is that of self-help groups –
where groups save regularly, accumulate funds, manage accounts,
and link with banks and other MFIs. This mechanism is different
from the Grameen-type cluster-based lending by reinforcing relational
accountability associations. Hence, exploring the way accountability
relationships manifest at the borrower level with different microfinance
lending models assists in future policy formation and MFI practices in
the field. Furthermore, studies involving other products and services
beyond microfinance, such as micro-savings, micro-insurance and
micro-leasing, could generate further insights into the management
of complex accountability relationships. Finally, the management of
vertical and relational accountability when MFIs use new technologies,
such as mobile payments or agent banking, that limit the role and
power of MFOs provides an interesting example of non-human agents
in accountability relationships.
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NOTES
1. A pseudonym.
2. HMI is owned by its parent NGO. While it is a not-for-profit entity, it does
have a commercial focus.
3. ‘Portfolio-at-risk’ is the value of all loans outstanding that have one or more
instalments past due by more than a certain number of days (CGAP 2003).
In this case, it is one day and 30 days, respectively.
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